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Background 
About one year ago a short but heated discussion between professional philosophers in 
Norway appeared in the publication for the Norwegian Doctors Union.1 The debate 
concerned how to treat potential organ donors and their bodies if death was imminent: 
Would elective ventilation2 be an acceptable procedure from an ethical perspective? The 
perceived ‘lack’ of organs and acceptable donors was emphasized and so-called ‘Kantian’ 
arguments were employed in the debate both for and against establishing a practice of 
elective ventilation.  
 
Arguments concerning organ donors and other so called ‘bio-ethical’ questions have been 
numerous both in the popular press and in more specialized publications during the last 
couple of years. Questions regarding selection of and research on fertilized human eggs, 
abortion, organ donation and euthanasia have been aggressively debated both by the 
general public and by professional philosophers, and in all likelihood these arguments 
will continue and grow in the foreseeable future as we see the possibilities of intervention 
and ‘improvement’ increasing through medical research. However, several of these 
arguments arise from positions that appear to take certain ideas about both moral 
philosophy and the human body for granted. Usually these ideas point to a certain 
‘location’ within our lives or our bodies as the starting point or foundation of our moral 
worth or lack thereof; and many of the disputes and the participants in these subsequently 
disagree more about where exactly this marker is to be found in a ‘technical’ sense than 
anything else. The general and questionable understanding within these ‘bio-ethical’ 
arguments seems to be that if this point could be sufficiently delineated and agreed upon, 
these disputes would be much fewer in number and easier to resolve.  
                                                 
1 Lars Johan Materstvedt and Johan-Arnt Hegvik, "Organdonasjon, Elektiv Ventilasjon Og Etikk," 
Tidsskriftet for Den norske lægeforening 19 (2004). 
2 Artificial respiration/ventilation exclusively in order to preserve the viability of organs considered 
reusable. 
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Introduction 
How do you develop a focus on ‘the body’ in ethics? How do the bodily aspects of our 
being come to matter in ethical perspectives? How do you assure that the perspective on 
‘the body’ developed in an ethical theory acknowledges how certain aspects of our 
physical being might be more culturally dependent than others? 
 
As human beings we look at ourselves today from perspectives that more or less take our 
equal moral worth for granted. We see it as natural that the basic unit of moral worth is a 
person or human being. However, this understanding becomes less self-evident when we 
consider the sharp ethical dilemmas that arise in bio-ethical contexts. Medical personnel 
who care deeply about their patients may in critical situations be forced to weigh who 
among several patients they should prioritize saving. These matters of triage seldom give 
time for philosophical investigation or careful deliberation in public. In making these 
decisions those involved have to rely on established practices, feelings and intuition. 
Philosophy might nonetheless be of assistance in these difficult decisions by criticizing 
and hopefully clarifying the basic thoughts that form the practices, feelings and intuitions 
about moral worth that are brought to bear on these matters.  
 
My initial suspicion when I started to consider these questions was that we have a 
tendency to overvalue mental aspects as a marker of moral worth in relation to our 
bodies. It is often taken for granted that our worth is fixed in a direct relationship to the 
status of our souls, intellect or consciousness – all mental aspects of our being. While the 
status of our feelings, affections and desires or other more physically based aspects are 
more contingent and fickle in comparison. Thus quite often the conclusion is drawn that 
if our mental aspects seem to be missing our moral status has also disappeared. This 
conclusion is probably less self evident than it seems. Our self-conceptions, whether we 
see ourselves as ‘mental’ or as ‘physical’ beings, might of course all be some form of 
cultural constructions; especially when these constructions determine what is to be 
considered as ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of culture or nature and hence ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to 
change by us. However determining that something is culturally constructed does not 
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necessarily imply that it is unimportant, or that our feelings towards for instance ‘the 
body’ are less valid. Hence our view of what we are is also in the end a view of what to 
do.  
 
With this backdrop my aim with this paper is to take a fresh look at how to understand 
the moral subject from the perspective of ‘the body’ and to try to distinguish what ‘voice’ 
is given to this bodily perspective within moral theory. In order to do this I will examine 
three different philosophical perspectives that frequently appear in (bio-) ethical debates 
today: 1) The Kantian position. 2) Virtue Ethics. 3) The Ethics of Care. Each position 
entails different conceptions of moral beings and their worth, and each position therefore 
constructs the essential elements of what it means to be a moral subject or agent worthy 
of respect in different ways.  My expectation in looking towards these three approaches 
was to find affirmation of my impression of the Kantian approach to be mostly concerned 
with the rational aspects of the person and less sensitive towards ‘the body’ and particular 
practical problems in interpersonal relationships. I expected that reason would be the sole 
basis of our respect for persons in a Kantian perspective, since reason determines the will. 
Furthermore I anticipated finding the Ethics of Care in the opposite end of the scale with 
more focus on the bodily aspects of our being in demarcating who to treat with respect. 
My expectation further was to find Virtue Ethics in a middle position, where both 
material and spiritual aspects of our being would be given weight in deliberations on 
moral respect.  
 
To be able to elicit a understanding of the possible worth of ‘the body’ I therefore 
decided to focus particularly on how the relationship between ‘the body’ and ‘the mind’ 
is construed in these three positions and to see how this affects ‘who’ is considered to be 
moral subjects (patients). If different valuations are made of the ‘somatic’ or ‘mental’ 
aspects of our being within these three positions this might also reveal how the attitude of 
a particular approach towards ‘the body’ is to be understood. Is ‘the body’ accorded 
respect in any way independently of ‘the mind’? In this context it is also important to be 
aware that the extent to which ‘the mind’ or ‘the psyche’ is taken as a part of ‘the body’ 
might be unclear or underdeveloped, and also how ideas about the self might exclude 
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‘bodily’ or ‘somatic’ aspects. My point is however not to attempt to resolve the debate on 
‘the mind-body problem’,3 or anything resembling this problem. My focus is on the 
moral respect we usually have for persons, and to try to understand how ‘the body’ shares 
this respect.  This occasionally becomes a problem of terminology as philosophers may 
employ terms as ‘person’, ‘human being’ or ‘individual’ etc. in ways that might fail to 
equal a embodied or unified moral subject, or might not even be intended to equal it. We 
also have to be aware of how the recurring phenomenon of splitting influences how ‘the 
body’ and ‘the mind’ is understood: 
 
The psychoanalytic concept of splitting, like that of repression, has a narrow, technical 
use as well as a broader metapsychological and metaphoric meaning. Just as 
repression became a paradigm for a larger cultural process, so might splitting be 
suggestive not only for individual psychic processes but also for supraindividual ones. 
Technically, splitting refers to a defense against aggression, an effort to protect the 
“good” object by splitting off its “bad” aspects that have incurred aggression. But in 
its broader sense, splitting means any breakdown of the whole, in which parts of the 
self or other are split off and projected elsewhere. In both uses it indicates a 
polarization, in which opposites – especially good and bad - can no longer be 
integrated; in which one side is devalued, the other is idealized, and each is projected 
onto different objects. 4
 
At times different entities may also be given different moral status depending on whether 
they are examined from the perspective of the agent or from the perspective of the subject 
(patient) that is the ‘beneficiary’ of the agent’s actions. In the following it is therefore this 
particular and morally significant other (as patient) that will be the main focus of my 
                                                 
3 Understood as the problem whether the ’mental’ aspects of the world or consciousness are in the end 
explainable in fundamentally non-mental terms. The ‘scientific’ view that everything is fundamentally 
physical is curious in light of the equally popular idea of having some aspect of what is ‘mental’ to be the 
sole foundation of moral worth. Both positions seem equally untenable. 
4 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination, 1st ed. 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 63. 
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investigation into how to understand the bodily aspects of the moral subject. I will supply 
this approach with the perspective from the agent where that seems to be required.  
 
 
The Kantian moral subject 
Immanuel Kant’s moral theory5 is perhaps the most familiar moral theory for students of 
philosophy all over the world, and accordingly much has been said about whether his 
theories are convincing, in need of revision, or just plain wrong. I do not wish to enter 
into these debates on what is the authoritative reading of Kant, or on which ground he 
might fail to give us a convincing moral theory. Instead, I will try to give a brief account 
of the relevant issues that he considers and how these shape his moral theory. Then, 
hopefully, we will be in a position to make a closer examination of his description of the 
moral subject that will facilitate a later contrast with other ethical outlooks with regard to 
what ‘voice’ is given to ‘the body’. 
 
Traditionally Kant’s moral theory has been interpreted as strictly intellectualist or 
rationalistic, where the moral subject is understood as essentially dominated by its 
intellectual side. However, my following examination of his treatment of ‘the body’ or 
the physical aspects of the moral subject, does not give support to this traditional 
interpretation. 
 
The Moral Law 
Kant’s initial problem in his moral theory does originate in a ‘rationalistic’ understanding 
of ethical questions: How is it possible to consider as valid our everyday ideas of freedom 
                                                 
5 I will focus my treatment of Kant’s moral theory on how it is presented in: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork 
of the Metaphysic of Morals (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). Immanuel Kant and Mary J. Gregor, 
Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997)., Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Texts in German 
Philosophy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991),Immanuel Kant and Werner S. 
Pluhar, Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1987). 
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and choice as essential to moral responsibility, and at the same time provide an 
understanding of how moral rules can effectively bind us as moral subjects? Even though 
we consider ourselves as free and independent, normativity does make claims on us, and 
to be able to say that something is absolutely right or wrong, normativity must be able to 
make absolute claims. It must be able to obligate us unconditionally to do or refrain from 
doing something. It must have the force of law. The solution of this conflict between 
freedom and obligation for Kant is located in the will. A good will, the only thing in or 
out of this world that is good without qualification6 is that which is not influenced by 
anything external to itself, and that through reason gives its own principles of action the 
form of law. The only way to make sure that your human will is good is to act only from 
the duty of following the law of reason. To exclusively be motivated by reverence for the 
law.7  
 
Kant gives this categorical imperative for human moral agents a total of five formulations 
that are meant to highlight different aspects of the moral law for all rational beings. These 
formulations are as such seen as interchangeable and equally valid: 
1. “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.” 
2. “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law 
of nature.” 
3. “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end.” 
4. “…, the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.” 
5. “All maxims as proceeding from our own making of law ought to harmonize with a 
possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature.”8 
 
                                                 
6  Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 393. 
7  Ibid., 400. 
8  Ibid. 
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Originating in rationality, the moral law is valid for all rational beings. Now the crucial 
point with reference to ‘the body’ in relation to Kant’s moral subject is ‘who’ are worthy 
of the agent’s consideration in reference to the moral law? Does this for instance depend 
on a previous relationship? Does this relationship have to be between two equals? Is this 
being passive or provocative in relation to the active agent? 
 
Moral Worth 
The only thing that can conceivably have moral worth without qualification in Kant’s 
theory is a good will.9 The moral worth of an action or the agent consequently is 
dependent on what ‘incentive’ influences the will. Only when the will is determined by 
respect10  for the moral law may the will of the agent be judged to be good and the action 
moral:11 ”Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.”12 – To desire what is 
necessary for it to be a good action. Acting from duty thus is to have a moral interest, and 
this is opposed to any other sensible interest that you might or might not have in your 
action. But, ‘who’ is it that has a will that is determined in this way?  
Kant considers three different types of beings as candidates for moral worth: Non-rational 
sensible beings (i.e. animals), rational sensible beings (i.e. humans), and supra-sensible 
rational beings (i.e. holy beings).13
 
The moral worth of non-rational sensible beings 
Kant explicitly states that animals, that is, non-rational sensible beings, are to be likened 
to things: “Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things. The latter can 
awaken in us inclination and even love if they are animals (e.g. horses, dogs, and so 
forth), and also fear, like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey, but never respect.”14 
Accordingly, as things, animals may be the object of many different feelings, but never 
the respect that is reserved for moral worth. Animals are from their lack of rationality and 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 393. 
10 Or reverence. 
11 Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:72. 
12 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 400. 
13 Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:74 - 77. 
14 Ibid., 5:76. 
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(free) will by definition excluded from the possible sphere of moral subjects both as 
agents and as possible moral relations to agents. 
 
The moral worth of supra-sensible beings 
The supra-sensible beings or holy beings that Kant refers to are probably best to be 
understood as God, angels, or as (a) perfect being(s). As perfect, a supra-sensible being is 
always an ideal of pure rationality unable to differ from the moral law. Indeed, the 
‘moral’ law is not even to be understood as an expression of obligation in reference to a 
holy being, since a holy being never will be inclined to diverge from the law. Thus a 
more proper name for the law of supra-sensible beings is the ‘holy’ law.15 A supra-
sensible purely rational being will always be moral and can not be thought to be 
otherwise;16 but, since it is supra-sensible, it will not have a feeling of respect for the 
moral law since only sensible beings have feelings and bodies. Nor will this being ever be 
presented for us as a possible object of a feeling of respect or moral worth, since both 
depends on having a sensible nature, on needing incentives and on appearing in the 
sensible world. Thus the adherence to the moral law by the holy beings lacks merit, and 
the Kantian feeling of respect should be understood as ‘tribute’ supposed to be paid to 
merit where a being could have refused to follow the law. Lacking inclination, and hence 
lacking any hindrance to adhere to the law, the holy beings are purely determined by 
reason. They are good, and have no cause to be other than good.  As long as moral worth 
by definition depends on either being an object of the feeling of respect or the ability to 
have feelings of respect (having bodies), supra-sensible beings will thus indeed be holy, 
but they will not have moral worth i.e. merit, in the manner of human (rational and 
sensible) beings. Consider here Kant’s own words: “All three concepts, however – that of 
an incentive, of an interest and of a maxim – can be applied only to finite beings. For they 
all presuppose a limitation of the nature of a being … Thus they cannot be applied to the 
divine will.”17 In a slightly different perspective where Kant discusses whether moral 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 5:82. 
16 ”for where the former [as in a holy being] is the case there is no imperative.” Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, 222. 
17 Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:79. 
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worth as virtue is to be accorded that “which can not be otherwise” i.e. rationality, it is 
clear that only the part that admits change: - your personality, character or in other words 
your individual sensible appearance is to be accorded respect or worth.18 The ‘holy’ part 
of our being is not considered as changeable in this way, nor is God or other possible 
‘holy’ beings open to virtue in this sense. It follows that God does not have merit in terms 
of overcoming a hindrance to the law, he has a necessary will. God does not have to make 
an investigation in the world to find out whether what he ‘decides’ is good. God 
necessarily is good, and thus is independent from others, omnipotent, perfectly 
encompassing all possible viewpoints. Any further discussion of God’s goodness or 
perfection is not likely to provide more insight into the status of ‘the body’ so I will leave 
this as it stands here.19
 
The moral worth of rational sensible beings 
A human being is both rational and sensible, and for Kant both describable under an idea 
of freedom and an idea of obligation. Our intellect is free, but since we are particular 
creatures in the world with our own particular viewpoints and perspectives, we are 
neither omniscient nor able to remain unaffected by the world.  Our ‘inner’ moral worth 
thus depends on our respect for the moral law. Our moral worth in the eyes of others 
depends on how we provide an example of this respect i.e. an example of ‘good will’ or 
virtue, to the experience of others occupying their own particular positions throughout the 
world. Only if our will is determined by the moral law alone is it a good will, and only if 
our will has the moral law as its direct principle is it a free will, untouched by any 
empirical determination. At this point it becomes necessary to quote Kant in full: 
 
 But since this law is still something in itself positive – namely the form of an 
intellectual causality, that is, of freedom – it is at the same time an object of 
respect inasmuch as, in opposition to its subjective antagonist, namely the 
inclinations in us, it weakens self-conceit; and inasmuch as it even strikes down 
                                                 
18 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 381. 
19 However the questions of God’s embodiment in the world and of the fall of Lucifer are interesting points 
in relation to ‘holy’ beings, their perfection, and the possibility of change. 
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self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the greatest respect and so too 
the ground of a positive feeling that is not of empirical origin and is cognized a 
priori. Consequently, respect for the moral law is a feeling that is produced by an 
intellectual ground, and this feeling is the only one that we can cognize 
completely a priori and the necessity of which we can have insight into.20
 
As free and intellectual beings the moral law is necessarily part of our nature, and as 
sensible beings we are as such capable of feeling an absence of sensible determination, 
and accordingly able to feel respect for the moral law within us. “In calling a feeling (the 
feeling of respect) intellectual, a qualification must be taken as understood; this feeling 
too, qua feeling, is sensible, a receptivity, though one that does not have its own sense; 
but we may still call it intellectual insofar as the basis that gives rise to it is (rational and 
as such) intellectual rather than sensible.”21
 
Thus far this consideration of morality and good will might lend itself at least partially to 
an intellectualist interpretation of Kant’s conception of the moral subject. Especially if 
the demand for being purely influenced by duty and the moral law is read as if the source 
of failure or vice accordingly must be our sensible nature (the body). A closer 
examination of Kant’s concept of Evil is helpful in order to clear up this 
misunderstanding. 
 
Understanding Kantian Evil 
How are we as both sensible and free rational beings obligated by the moral law still able 
to be Evil? What is the source of Evil in humanity? Are we corrupted by our bodies, our 
sensible nature? It is at least clear that we would not be Evil if we were unable to do 
otherwise. If our ‘bodily’ urges or instincts were to drive us, unable to resist, that would 
make us determined (as animals are), but not Evil. Evil as a concept hence presupposes 
rational freedom. Evil consequently is a problem of moral character, and as such: “it is a 
failure that not only leaves the objective principle of morality concretely unrealized, but 
                                                 
20 Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73. 
21 Kant and Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, fn. 205. 
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also leaves the potential of the natural human aptitude(s) for good unrealized.”22 Evil 
hence is not-wanting to be good; wanting to be motivated by something different than the 
law, a free but ‘bad’ character. Evil, just as well as good, thus clearly has an ‘inner’ or 
free intellectual basis. I do not intend to try to resolve this paradox of the origin of Evil 
now, but instead I intend to proceed as if undoubtedly Evil humans are still to be 
considered as responsible and members of a possible “kingdom of ends”; as calling us to 
question the moral worth of our actions towards them. They are regardless of their Evil 
unable to forfeit their moral worth by choice as long as they are considered to be rational 
creatures under the Idea of a moral law.23 Neither the existence of Evil, nor its source, 
may thus be used as an argument for disvaluing our sensible part, ‘the body’, in relation 
to the intellect. 
 
Persons 
As long as it is impossible to experience a perfectly good will (i.e. God) or the moral law, 
in the sensible world, since our sensibility constitutes our experiences, we can only in our 
consideration of others presuppose the Idea24 of the moral law and therefore consider 
others as providing us with examples of the moral law. In this context: “All reverence for 
a person is properly only reverence for the law (of honesty and so on) of which that 
person gives us an example. Because we regard the development of our talents as a duty, 
we see too in a man of talent a sort of example of the law (the law of becoming like him 
by practice), and this is what constitutes our reverence for him. All moral interest, so-
called, consists solely in reverence for the law.”25 The relevant criteria for being a 
person, for having the ability to provide an example of the moral law to us in experience, 
is for Kant the ability to outwardly posit and to signal (i.e. communicate) that action is 
                                                 
22 G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, 
Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 141. 
23 In practical matters however, this should not be taken as prohibiting punishment (or even killing) under 
an idea of civil justice. See for instance: Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, footnote430,Kant, 
The Metaphysics of Morals, 331-33,Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:37-38. 
24 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 448, footnote. Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical 
Reason, 5:46-48. 
25  Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 401** (footnote). 
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taken out of reasons, that you have ends.26 In so far that we only have experience of 
humans as reason-giving, the only creatures that give us grounds to suppose that they act 
under an Idea of moral law and freedom are other humans as they appear in particular 
relationships to us. However, if other creatures should appear as examples, for instance 
through advances in technology or through alien encounters etc., to be able to have 
practical ends for their actions, they should also be considered as persons under the Idea 
of the moral law. Now, since this arguably has not happened yet, the only persons we 
have encountered in practical experience are humans. Reason in itself is however clearly 
not enough, the practical desire to be good, a moral interest, and a capacity for such 
desire, sensibility, is also needed: “it does not at all follow [from the fact that] a being [is 
endowed with] reason, that such contains a capacity unconditionally to determine the 
power of choice through the mere conception of the qualification of its maxims for 
universal legislation… The most rational worldly being could after all require certain 
motivations stemming from objects of inclination in order to determine its choice, [and] 
apply thereto the most rational deliberations… without having any inkling… of even the 
possibility of something like a moral, absolutely commanding law.”27 Here again Kant 
points out to his readers that the sensible nature of humans is essential to our 
understanding of them as moral subjects, as persons in relation to ourselves. 
 
Realizing the good 
The central conditions of Kant’s ethics is that for a moral life, society and the highest 
good – a good will, to be possible in the actual world, people must adopt 3 basic 
principles: 1) always think for yourself, 2) always consider the perspective of others as 
well as your own point of view, 3) always think in a consistent manner.28 If you adopt 
these 3 maxims in a ‘resolute’ manner you are on your way to realize your moral 
character – the overall end of humanity.  
 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 415. 
27 Kant (RV 26n), as quoted in Munzel, Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of 
Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment, 118. 
28 Kant and Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, 294. 
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The third formulation of the moral law states that: “Act in such a way that you always 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as 
a means, but always at the same time as an end.”29 Here Kant makes a slight distinction 
between the ‘humanity’ of a person and the ‘person’ that point to different aspects of the 
moral subject in reference to the moral law. In so far as the reference to humanity is more 
extensive than the reference to personhood, to posit the humanity of the person as an end 
is to say that both personhood and ‘what makes personhood possible’ is to be considered 
as an end. If being ‘a person’ in this limited context is roughly30 equal to being rational 
and if being human is equal to being both rational and finite i.e. corporeal, to make the 
humanity of a person an end necessitates regarding both ‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ as 
equally sharing in what constitutes moral worth and dignity.31 Only by being able to 
appear to us in the world may any being be able to provide us with an example of the 
moral law, i.e. be in a moral relationship with us. There would thus be no moral law, no 
idea of reverence or action from duty without the sensible part of human nature. “But we 
can indeed see that although experience shows that man as a sensible being has the 
capacity to choose in opposition to as well as in conformity with the law, his freedom as 
an intelligible being cannot be defined by this, since appearances cannot make any 
supersensible object (such as free choice) understandable.”32
  
Consequently, even though the ground for the outward experience of personhood might 
be missing at the moment, as for instance in a case of severe brain damage or dementia 
etc., proper reverence for the humanity in yourself or others does include as worthy the 
body ‘by itself’ from a Kantian perspective. Again, consider that no moral worth can be 
related to a holy and purely intelligible being by us since it will not appear for us directly 
as an example of good will or the moral law proper. “Hence I cannot dispose of man in 
my person by maiming, spoiling, or killing.”33 Nor would you treat the humanity of 
                                                 
29 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 429. 
30 This perspective is of course strained, - from the point of view of my argument it is a misunderstanding 
to even consider equating personhood with being rational since Kant’s point, as I understand it, is the 
indivisibility of humanity. 
31 That is, if the paradoxical origin of the feeling of respect is taken seriously.  
32 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 226.  
33 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 429. My bold 
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others as an end if you dispose of their body solely on the ground that they lack 
‘personhood’ or rationality (or for instance: outward signs of brain stem activity) at that 
point in time. It is still in a relationship to us, at least minimally so. Without a body no 
humanity, no example of moral worth is possible, no good will (apart from holiness) can 
exist in our world. To further sharpen this indivisibility of the humanity of the person it is 
important to emphasize that for Kant the prohibition against treating the body as a means 
also excludes treating various body parts as means: “But acquiring a member of a human 
being is at the same time acquiring the whole person, since a person is an absolute 
unity.”34 Although on other times Kant’s oblique references to the humanity that dwells 
‘within’ us, and homo noumenon vs. homo phaenomenon35  indicate that our personality 
or humanity is always something other than what appears, and I do not wish to appear to 
ignore this, none of these references to man as an ‘intelligible being’ contradict the 
interpretation that ‘the body’ is part of man’s fundamental nature. As long as a ‘good 
will’ is what constitutes moral worth, and as long as willing and free choice together is 
the privilege of humans only (rational sensible and practical beings); thorough 
consideration of the ‘holy’ part of humanity, as is necessary in Kant’s project, does not 
indicate that this ‘holy’ part is more important or what really counts. Again Kant’s own 
words are revealing:  
 
To annihilate the subject of morality in one’s own person is to root out the 
existence of morality itself from the world, as far as one can, even though 
morality is an end in itself. Consequently, disposing of oneself as a mere means to 
some discretionary end is debasing humanity in one’s person (homo noumenon) to 
which man (homo phaenomenon) was nevertheless entrusted for preservation. 
To deprive oneself of an integral part or organ (to maim oneself) – for example, to 
give away or sell a tooth to be transplanted into another’s mouth, or to have 
oneself castrated in order to get an easier livelihood as a singer, and so forth – are 
ways of partially murdering oneself.36
                                                 
34 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 278. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 423. 
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Respecting the humanity of another as I understand Kant therefore entails respecting the 
finite nature of others, their bodies, apart from but still in the context of the status of their 
intelligible nature.37 It should be sufficient that you believe it possible for them to have 
an intelligible nature, rationality, on a practical basis on account of our experience of 
them as active participants in society. 
 
This however is contrary to the intellectualist reading of Kant’s moral theory where only 
the presence of rationality seems to count towards moral worth. That reading however 
seems to be a case of confusion between the Idea of the moral law as a necessary 
presupposition for justifying morality, and the possibility of proof of a good will to 
experience. Kant is unwavering in his insistence that neither knowledge about the thing-
in-itself nor of any being’s intelligible nature is possible. No absolute proof of an entity’s 
membership in ‘humanity’ may be established. It is thus a matter of practical moral 
judgment to determine whether you should act as if you are confronted with a moral 
subject (patient) or not.  
 
Practical moral judgment 
The basis of our supposition that only humans provide us with an example of the moral 
law and hence a good will in experience, is in Kant’s terminology a practical moral 
judgment. To understand why only humans satisfy our judgment in this manner, we need 
to give an account of how practical moral judgment function.  
 
When we make a judgment to determine if some entity is a person or a thing, i.e. in 
making a judgment about its potential for moral worth, the judgment does not lie in 
comparing it to other entities. Judgments about worth are different from judgments about 
equivalency or relative value: “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a 
dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is 
exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has dignity.”38 Then what 
                                                 
37 ”Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive, and this feeling 
is also directed to no object except on this basis.” Kant and Gregor, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:78.  
38 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 434.  
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kind of judgment is this? It is probably something very similar to an aesthetic judgment. 
In judging the appearance of a particular individual on the basis of its relation to us at this 
moment, we are making a judgment about this individual’s moral character. While doing 
this we will however not be able to assess the ‘holy’ part of someone’s character, not 
even our own, as this ‘holy’ part never appears to us in the world. Anyone might possibly 
have a good will at a given point in time, but we can only learn about and judge his 
empirical character, how his acts appear to us. Since the question of the motivation of the 
will is the basis of any judgment about character, the ‘true’ virtue of a person is at best 
accessible to the person himself through his ‘inner’ judgment of his conscience, and 
consequently it is only indirectly available to others through his displays of character. 
“The virtue of an individual must, however, be assessed from within and this requires 
reflective judgment… Kant introduced reflective judgment as an aesthetic mode of 
comparing various subjective assessments of beauty, but ultimately it exposes something 
incomparable, namely, the sublimity of individual character.”39 Possible moral worth is 
therefore again limited to sensible rational beings we can relate to, i.e. actually 
communicate with: “It is true that our liking both for the beautiful and for the sublime not 
only differs recognizably from other aesthetic judgments by being universally 
communicable, but by having this property it also acquires an interest in relation to 
society (where such communication may take place).”40 Only through community and 
communication may a being’s character and the basis of aesthetic judgment become 
known to us. This sensus communis is different from everyday public opinion or what is 
usually referred to as ‘common sense’ since it is an ideal and might well not be actual, 
even though Kant thinks it should always be considered possible to bring the two to 
accord. Practical moral judgment and aesthetic judgment about worth presupposes others 
to communicate with, thus our duty towards the moral law forces us to relate to others 
and to consider the practical consequences of our actions so that they make a true sensus 
communis possible: “Reflection in the case of judgment does go beyond the given 
representation and is guided by a subjective principle of inference. In the case of aesthetic 
                                                 
39 Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant," in The Journal 
of Value Inquiry (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 218.  
40 Kant and Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, 136.  
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judgment, Kant allows reflection to expand a privately felt response to an object into a 
common response. Here the commonness is not given, but projects a sensus communis or 
an ideal human community.”41 Moral judging thus is to be understood as a mode of 
evaluation, an indirect evaluative skill that internally is the effect of conscience, and 
externally the effect of a (ideal) community: “[Taste is] an idea which everyone must 
generate within himself and by which he must judge any object of taste, any example of 
someone’s judging by taste, and even the taste of every one (else).”42  
 
Practical moral judgment here emerges as a developed skill acquired in and through a 
community with others so that other point of views may be understood and taken into 
consideration. Hence practical moral judgment as such cannot be developed in isolation.  
From a further practical consideration on the possibility of knowledge of the sensible 
world, the question of when membership in ‘humanity’ begins accordingly cannot be 
ascertained once and for all, but once membership is granted in a reasonable manner, i.e. 
a relationship is established, it cannot be revoked. True respect for the moral law will 
demand a plurality of viewpoints and as large and differentiated membership in the 
sensus communis as is possible – to realize the goal of humanity. 
 
Kantian Virtue  
The faculty of judgment in this context emerges as the condition of morality and hence of 
man’s sociability, i.e. his dependence on actual relationships to others for the needs of 
both his mind and his body. All acts of judgment are free, and all free acts are exceptional 
and exemplary. Acting in contrast to thinking, always deal with particulars – and in so far 
as judgment makes a decision to hold something as good or beautiful or a duty, it is a 
particular decision. A moral decision will be made by bringing the particular under the 
concept of the moral law, while an aesthetic decision is made without a concept (of the 
beautiful) in mind. However, both the moral and the aesthetic would be meaningless 
unless they could be communicated to someone else, whether ‘internal’ or ‘external’. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
41 Makkreel, "Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant," 214.  
42 Kant and Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, 79.  
Vollan 20 
Thus bringing morality into the world needs the faculty of judgment and actual 
relationships to others; others who are able to communicate about aesthetics and morality 
from different viewpoints. This underlying requirement of communicability is hence the 
basis of common sense (as sensus communis), without it, both ‘common’ and ‘sense’ 
would be replaced by some private ‘insanity’. The clearest example of this 
communicative requirement is found in aesthetic judgment since it is held to be the most 
unrestricted and free type of judgment. Aesthetic judgment as opposed to moral judgment 
does not even refer itself to a concept (as the moral law), and thus is much more 
independent from the understanding than any other judgment. Since it is not referring to a 
concept, the aesthetic is the type of judgment that by itself only deals with the particular 
qua particular43 i.e. the unique in this particular experience - that may be communicated 
or shared with others. The beautiful thus emerges as what is unique but shareable, 
incomparable but common, very reminiscent of the description of an end-in-itself. The 
salient feature about judgment in this context seems to be that a judgment finding 
something to be an end-in-itself i.e. as having worth, is an aesthetic judgment, a capacity 
of those who themselves are ends - man as an active member of society. Possessing taste, 
and refining taste, emerges as the relational condition of both aesthetic and moral 
judgments, and the chances are slim that someone that shows themselves to be without 
taste will be able to be moral.44 “The ‘in-between’ of judging subjects is the realm of 
objects fit for judgment, and we display taste in rendering judgment upon them. This 
display of taste is a social relation, for we are always already committed to seeking 
acknowledgment from our fellows, to get them to acknowledge the reasonableness or 
rationality of our judgment and, thereby, to confirm our own ‘good taste’.”45
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43Hannah Arendt and Ronald Beiner, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 66.  
44 Ibid., 111. 
45 Ibid., 121. 
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Incomparable worth of the body 
If both ‘the body’ and ‘the mind’ thus equally share in the ‘humanity’ that founds moral 
worth, we cannot give ‘the mind’ a higher price, in for instance medical matters, than ‘the 
body’.46 Thus, treating the body of any member of ‘humanity’ as something that only has 
value in relation to his rationality, or something that is at all comparable and has a price, 
seems to be in conflict with at least the third formulation of the moral law. Attempts to 
seize the moral high ground by referring to the Kantian tradition as supposedly giving 
legitimacy to undervaluing ‘the body’ in the treatment of others, confuses the ‘holy’ part 
of humanity with ‘humanity’ itself. Strictly speaking, it is also a clear misunderstanding 
of Kant to attribute the ‘holy’ part of our humanity to the functioning of the organ of 
‘inner’ sense (as for instance the mind/brain). A preferable reading that is more friendly 
to Kant’s project is to look for the moral worth in our aesthetic appreciation of a 
particular human being or in our judgment of his displays of character. Much of worth in 
a person cannot after all be appreciated outside a real community since taste only can be 
developed in the company of others. Beauty and morality are thus for Kant necessarily 
interconnected: “It is man, alone among all objects in the world, who admits of an ideal 
of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, [i.e.., in man considered] as an intelligence, 
is the only [thing] in the world that admits of the ideal of perfection.”47 – the ideal in this 
figure consists in the expression of the moral, and judging by such a standard can never 
be purely aesthetic, nor can a judgment by an ideal of beauty be a mere judgment of 
taste.48
 
Beauty is consequently the exclusive arena of man as a social being: “Agreeableness 
holds for nonrational animals too; beauty only for human beings, i.e., beings who are 
animal and yet rational, though it is not enough that they be rational (e.g., spirits) but they 
must be animal as well; the good, however, holds for every rational being as such, …, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
46 “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be 
put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has 
dignity.” Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 434. 
47 Kant and Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, 81.  
48 Ibid., 84. 
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only the liking involved in taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free, since we are 
not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason.”49  
The beautiful is as a result something we all like without having an interest in it, and 
therefore we cannot help but conclude that it contains a basis for being liked that is the 
same for everyone. We then believe it to be justified to require - ” a similar liking from 
everyone because he cannot discover, underlying this liking, any private conditions, on 
which only he might be dependent, so that he must regard it as based on what he can 
presuppose in everyone else as well. … . For from concepts there is no transition to the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws; but these carry an 
interest with them, while none is connected with pure judgments of taste). …, a judgment 
of taste must involve a claim to subjective universality.”50
 
Virtue is an art 
In judging someone else’s character we will never be able to judge more than how this 
particular individual appears to us at this moment, and as such it is similar to the 
particularity of other judgments of taste in the manner that Kant has outlined them. We 
will have no basis for judging the ‘holy’ part of someone’s character, as it never appears 
in relation to us in the world. Anyone may at a given point in time possibly have a good 
will, we however cannot know this, we can only know his empirical character, and how 
his acts appear to us. He will thus only be a good human being through incessant laboring 
and becoming in a public manner.51 “It is only through the correlation of intelligible and 
empirical character that we can judge virtue.”52 As a result the ability to judge virtue is a 
skill developed inside culture and depends on actual community with others. It cannot be 
developed in isolation. Plurality, diversity and community therefore become 
preconditions for judging and developing character and virtue both in oneself and in 
others. It is then a duty to develop such virtue and community, since only through virtue 
and community with others will you acquire the skill needed to assess and refine your 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 52. 
50 Ibid., 54. 
51 Makkreel, "Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant," 211.  
52 Ibid., 212.  
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will towards the moral law. To purify your will so that it might be good in a way 
approaching perfection, actual experience with other people and community with others 
is needed. Hence the aesthetic assessment of the incomparable sublimity of individual 
character becomes possible,53 and (re)-producing character is an art(proper).54 In Kant’s 
own words: “Virtue so shines as an ideal that it seems, by human standards, to eclipse 
holiness itself, which is never tempted to break the law.*-*(Man with all his faults Is 
better than a host of angels without will. Haller)”55
 
Preliminary conclusion 
We make an aesthetic judgment when we determine if some entity is a person or a thing. 
We base this assessment on ‘common sense’ (sensus communis), its communicability to 
others and on skill developed from practical experience in actual relationships with 
others. We cannot refer this judgment to a concept and thus remove it from the inherent 
indeterminateness of aesthetic judgments. Attempting to develop such a concept is 
consequently to overstep the limits for our possible knowledge. The salient feature of an 
entity that separates a ‘thing’ from a moral subject is its ability to enter into a community 
through the possible communication of its character to others. References to a ‘true’ or 
‘inner’ self, the ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ thus do not compare to the moral subject that Kant has in 
mind. Kant’s moral subject is necessarily corporeal and relational, and different from a 
more generalized other due to its actual aesthetic quality of embodying the moral law. 
Our specific interests, even though they are at least partially contingent, do not just 
impose themselves on us, but are the products of our activity with others and by 
ourselves. Kant’s position thus (surprisingly) emerges as more practical and sensitive 
towards ‘the body’ than the ‘intellectualist’ readings allow, and both ‘mind’ and ‘body’ 
remain inseparable within the moral subject. The moral subject is a unity that naturally 
partakes in actual community and relationships with others, and that has ‘bodily’ and 
intellectual aspects on an equal level. 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 218. 
54 Kant and Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, 303. 
55 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 199. 
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Virtue Ethics and the moral subject 
The second approach towards ethics that I will consider from the perspective of the 
‘voice’ that is given to ‘the body’ is what is known as Virtue Ethics. Virtue Ethics is 
embraced by many of its adherents because it is supposed to give a stronger emphasis on 
actual living as opposed to rules and moral precepts, and it is subsequently often thought 
of as better equipped to handle complex and sensitive issues that arise in actual life in 
contrast to more ‘hypothetical’ dilemmas. 
 
What is Virtue Ethics? 
A right action in Virtue Ethics is basically what a virtuous agent would do under the 
present circumstances. A virtuous agent is someone with a steady disposition to display 
and exercise the virtues. A virtue is a character trait required for some specific conception 
of how to live a good/right/happy/flourishing life. The virtuous agent should have a 
continuous emotional attachment to virtue as well as practical wisdom, i.e. an 
understanding of how to live and sensitivity towards how this applies to his particular 
circumstances.56 The right action/attitude/feeling therefore is dependent on the idea of 
how to live, and this idea is not rigid but changes according to the requirements of the 
particular circumstances of the agent.57 Virtue theory in itself therefore does not provide 
a particular rule of how to act, and “two virtuous agents, faced with the same choice in 
the same circumstances, may act differently.”58 At the same time the understanding of 
‘how to live’ in Virtue Ethics is intended to convey that virtue does not belong to a 
separate sphere but instead covers our whole mode of life and relationship with the world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Also known as phronesis 
57 See for instance: Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues 
(London: Duckworth, 1999), 77. 
58 Rosalind Hursthouse, ”Virtue Theory And Abortion”, Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote, eds., Virtue 
Ethics, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 219. Footnote. 
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Agents 
Virtue theory considers as agents those who have practical wisdom and the ability to have 
or to develop an emotional attachment to some ideal of life. These two abilities are 
usually seen as inseparable and reliant on both: 
1. some minimal degree of functioning mental and physical abilities that enable 
participation in (a) society, and 
2. some actual participation in (a) society at a certain level. 
 
Thus learning virtue, or ‘learning to be good’, depends on being part of some interactive 
community with others. The level of participation and ability required for a specific 
society will however rely on this society’s idea of how to live, but in general the 
following groups are excluded: the very young, the (severely) brain damaged, the 
psychotic etc. The individual is usually considered dependent on having virtuous role 
models, on the prevailing norms and traditions that are present in his society, and on 
gaining experience of doing the right thing. The treatment of those who for any reason 
are unable to participate in this society depends however on the idea of life that this 
specific society adheres to. There is nothing that follows distinctively from virtue theory 
in general that requires any definite treatment of those that are excluded from a particular 
society. Neither is any evaluation of conflicting conceptions of ‘the good’ considered to 
be possible from the ‘outside’.59  Practically some specific requirements might follow 
from the qualifications of what it means to be social, to interact, to learn, and so on, that 
will yield a list of common virtues for all particular societies if at minimum they are to 
have some viability. Some effort has been made to provide a list of virtues that are at 
least acceptable to all known examples of human society. Owing to the inherent changing 
nature of virtue tracking changes in historical circumstances no such list of virtues can 
however be expected to stay complete for very long. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
59 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 77. 
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Motivation and practical wisdom 
The emotional attachment of the agent to virtue is what distinguishes him from others 
within his society, but there is disagreement on how to understand this emotional 
attachment. Moreover the central theme is not only what the agent feels, but how he acts 
and how he is motivated to act in this manner. A popular example is the virtue of 
friendship that usually is considered natural for all humans as social beings. True 
understanding of friendship might require that you honor different friendships in different 
ways. Consider a friend that is hospitalized: The general understanding of friendship is 
that if you are able to visit your friend at the hospital without undue hardship to yourself 
this is the right thing to do. Another hospitalized friend might be made uncomfortable by 
such a visit because he might resent being seen in such a state. Whether to visit or not 
thus depends on the nature and understanding of your particular friendship, and not on a 
general rule to visit hospitalized friends. The essential feature is that what you do is 
motivated by this particular friendship. If, however, your motivation is to be seen as a 
friend instead of being a friend, it will usually not be considered an act according to 
friendship, even though the particular circumstances and acts are at least outwardly 
identical. It is important that what you do is also based on the right understanding of the 
situation. If you fail to pick up on or consider your friends unease and visit him anyway, 
your motive might be correct but you will be lacking in practical wisdom or sensitivity. 
Accordingly it is very difficult to be a perfect friend, and therefore no general rule that 
states whether you are to be blamed for this lack of perfection is provided. Your 
blameworthiness might depend on a proviso that this was a foreseeable consequence of 
your character or the circumstances, or on your freedom to be or act differently. It might 
also depend on whether your visit was the result of a habitual60 or reasoned response to 
the situation.  
 
The underlying problem which reflects a range of positions within Virtue Ethics is the 
level of freedom and awareness that is considered appropriate to different virtues. Some 
                                                 
60 Habit understood as an automatic conditioned response. You may of course also have habits that are the 
result of conscious choice. 
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will emphasize the importance of not even being tempted to do otherwise.61 Others will 
consider the freedom to choose your character more important. This will also differ on 
account of how long term the consideration is supposed to be, ranging from the present 
moment to the fullness of your life, or even to your place in history.62 But as the example 
of friendship shows, getting it right within Virtue Ethics depends partially on having the 
correct type of motivation and awareness, and partially the additional factor of actually 
‘getting it right’.63 This additional factor is intended to reflect the complexity of all 
possible particular situations. Some will optimistically say that getting it right here 
depends on experience and practical wisdom, others will allow for an additional factor of 
(bad) luck. The luck factor will usually not affect your culpability, as the quite common 
accident of unplanned pregnancies attest to in our everyday experience. Pregnancy 
originating in failed birth control measures is often frowned upon and considered to be a 
mark of irresponsibility, just as much as if no birth control device was used, whereas 
sexual activity without a resulting pregnancy is considered to be a undeniable good. Yet it 
will all the same reflect on your character regardless of what you have done to prevent it. 
There is an underlying idea that ‘fortune favors the bold’, at least in the sense that bad 
luck might signal a lack of virtue. 
 
Necessity and freedom 
However difficult it is seen to control one’s urges, the accidents of our mortality and our 
biological nature; ideas of virtue always emphasizes an aspect of choice, sometimes 
especially when choice seems to be tragically absent. The fluid nature of what ‘getting it 
right’ means in light of its communal and historical nature, always keeps open the 
possibility of being excused or rather proven right at a later point in time. Accordingly 
lack of recognizable choice, even in retrospect, does not automatically remove blame or 
responsibility for getting it wrong. Only general approval64 might get you of the hook, in 
                                                 
61 As in considerations of the problem known as ‘akrasia’ 
62 One popular example originating with Aristotle is the end of Priam. 
63 “tracking the true and the false”, MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues, 57. and Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981), 
150. 
64 Here understood as for instance vindication of your actions through history. 
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the sense that the understanding of ‘getting it right’ changes in a sufficient manner. 
Nevertheless, sometimes no ‘right’ choice is available, and this might either reveal that 
you have placed yourself in a situation into which no virtuous person would be found, or 
that you only have the option to bear the consequences in a virtuous manner.65
 
The moral subject in MacIntyre’s66 Virtue Ethics 
Alistair MacIntyre is one of the best known theorists within the modern field of Virtue 
Ethics. This field is broad and diverse, and many accounts of virtue might not in specific 
detail agree with the account that MacIntyre gives. His account is in his own words that 
of “a Thomistic Aristotelian”67, and as such much discussion is possible on whether his 
theory is representative of this tradition or on whether this is the best version of Virtue 
Ethics that is possible. I do not wish to enter these debates but instead I want to give a 
brief account of the relevant issues that he considers and how they shape his virtue 
theory. Then hopefully we will also possess an understanding of the ethical significance 
given to ‘the body’ of the moral subject within the framework of MacIntyre’s virtue 
theory. 
 
Historicism and biology 
In After Virtue68 MacIntyre presents his historicist and narrative understanding of human 
life and human rationality: (Human) action may only be intelligible if understood as part 
of a narrative context, a life-story, and thus as more than atomistic choice. This life-story 
therefore enlarges our perspective from singular acts and makes it relevant to consider 
how particular acts fit within a larger whole with a beginning and an end. Every 
particular action reflects back to an understanding of personal identity and character that 
is embodied in the unity of a single life. This life is in a large degree shaped by particular 
                                                 
65 Rosalind Hursthouse gives a revealing discussion of these elements of virtue in:, ”Virtue Theory And 
Abortion”, Crisp and Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics, 226-38. 
66 I will treat MacIntyre’s understanding of virtue as it appears in: MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in 
Moral Theory. and MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. 
67 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, xi. 
68 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 
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social and historical facts, such as practices69 and institutions and their evolution, that 
provide the context for the actions performed by the moral subject. In order to be 
intelligible acts must be examined and understood in this context. Furthermore: “Moral 
philosophies, however they may aspire to achieve more than this, always do articulate the 
morality of some particular social and cultural standpoint…” 70 No external objective 
account of morality outside any tradition is possible, according to MacIntyre. There is no 
morality as such. Neither is there any generalized ‘human’ as such. All human identity is 
continuously a particular situated bodily identity, and it is important to acknowledge how 
“… in this present life it is true of us that we do not merely have, but are our bodies.”71 
MacIntyre here emphasizes clearly the biological foundation of his ethics in Dependent 
Rational Animals, and that his earlier position in After Virtue was mistaken. And he 
deems it reasonable to expect that other virtue ethicists or Aristotelians will have to 
provide some explanation if they choose a different approach than what he considers to 
be the necessary starting point: “Our initial animal condition.”72 However this shift in his 
evaluation of Aristotelian biology does not make it any easier for MacIntyre to realize his 
explicit goal to overcome what he considers to be the fallacy of Cartesian dualism. 
  
Virtue and the good 
The overriding and essential virtue for MacIntyre in Dependent Rational Animals is the 
virtue of ‘Just Generosity’.73 This virtue becomes accessible for us through realizing our 
human ‘telos’ – realizing and sustaining an idea of human beings as ‘independent 
practical reasoners’. Macintyre treats the conditions necessary for realizing our telos as 
independent natural reasoners on two interdependent levels: 
 
                                                 
69 ”… any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are 
systematically extended. Ibid., 187. 
70 Ibid., 268. 
71 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 6. 
72 Ibid., x. 
73 Ibid., 159. 
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1) Our initial animal nature: All human infants share with other intelligent animals74 the 
preconditions for becoming moral subjects. These include having mental lives,75 reasons 
or beliefs, i.e. preconditions for language, vulnerability to the environment; dependence 
on others through some form of social interaction with for instance parent or herd, and a 
biological as well as social evolutionary history. 
2) Our species-specific interpretative experiences and distinctive human potentialities 
(i.e. our telos) that characteristically are: our involvement with others,76 our narrative 
self-awareness, i.e. our ability to se ourselves in a temporal context, and our ability to be 
self-reflective and separate ourselves from our (immediate) desires.77
 
As a result our distinctive human potentialities consist of our ability to have our initial 
nature redirected and remade by and through the virtues so that our telos and highest 
good, the virtue of ‘Just Generosity’ might be continuously realized.78
 
The ‘utopia’ of unlimited friendship 
Realizing our telos and ultimate virtue is, by MacIntyre’s own admission, a somewhat 
utopian project.79 Nevertheless MacIntyre takes as his central analogy something that 
seems recognizable and accessible to all: the classical idea of friendship.80 ‘Just 
Generosity’ fully realized means that you comport yourself as if everyone are, or at least 
potentially will become, your friends. To manage this we need to develop an 
understanding of how essential friendship is to our project of being. No human being can 
exist alone absent from friend-like relationships without serious disability. Our self-
conception and our reflective rationality, language and communication, rearing and 
learning, all depend essentially on particular others that extend their care to our specific 
                                                 
74 This includes at least higher mammals as dolphins, dogs or monkeys. No clear point is made as to the 
limit to intelligence other than what might be inferred from the discussion on Heidegger’s choice of 
examples : Ibid., ch.5. 
75 Ibid., 33. 
76 Ibid., 14. 
77 Ibid., 69. 
78 See also: Ibid., 49. 
79 Ibid., 145. 
80 Ibid., 160-1. 
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self. These particular others might in different phases of our lives be family, friends or 
strangers, but we will always on account of our vulnerability (i.e. initial animal condition) 
be dependent on particular others to extend this form of care to us.81 This vulnerability 
that is common to all humans regardless of their virtue has two central features: 1) our 
bodily frailty vs. our environment, and 2) the possibility of (bad) luck.82 For these 
reasons everyone must be aware that all ideas about self-sufficiency are in the end 
illusions. 
 
‘Just Generosity’ and its underlying specific virtues consequently characterize a type of 
community with others that to MacIntyre realizes the human telos: We are to develop 
from our animal or infantile pre-reflective reasons and beliefs into independent practical 
reasoners. To be able to do this we are dependent on others caring for us as particulars 
and we also need to learn to extend our care to particular others. We are hence dependent 
on society in a fashion that is analogous to the mutual reliance of friendship. In addition 
we need such relationships to develop into self-reflective beings able to separate 
ourselves from immediate desires, thereby acquiring a ‘narrative’ understanding of our 
life and its particularity. This understanding and its attached development of imagination 
and realistic practical knowledge is only possible through cooperation, as well as a 
mutual shared understanding of ourselves and the world in community with others.83
 
The deeper problem 
The naturalness of our humanity 
The account that MacIntyre gives of our nature and of the body is oddly conflicted. On 
one side our telos is our nature and thus our distinctive human potentialities or our 
species-specific world relationship as well as our initial animality, are interdependent and 
should not be separated into two natures.84 The whole is needed to realize our 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 73 - 74. 
82 See also the discussion of ’Fortuna’ in MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 93. 
83 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 95. 
84 Ibid., 49-50. 
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‘humanity’. Accordingly MacIntyre quotes Aquinas saying: “Since the soul is part of the 
body of a human being, the soul is not the whole human being and my soul is not I”85 My 
body thus is essential to who I am. However, other parts of MacIntyre’s theory pull in the 
opposite direction. It is important for MacIntyre to give the ‘disabled’ an equal part in the 
deliberation of the (ideal) community. If they are unable to speak for themselves we 
should, in the spirit of friendship and ‘Just Generosity’, be able to speak for them. This 
presupposes that we have intimate knowledge of how they view the world, either on the 
basis of earlier communication as friends, or on the basis of previously having shared 
their condition as infants. However, if the inability to communicate on a level higher than 
infancy or animality can not be overcome, no proxy for the disabled can be assigned in 
the deliberative practices of the community, and we will only be able to speak for them in 
the manner parents generally speak for their children.86
 
The similarity between intelligent animals, infants and independent practical reasoners, 
virtuous or not, is somewhat surprisingly not treated as relevant to the concept of the 
ideal community that MacIntyre here advocates. Animals share with humans both ‘forms 
of life’ and the ability to deceive,87 and we can interpret or understand other species of a 
higher order (like dogs or dolphins) or infants, just as other adults. In spite of this 
MacIntyre is very careful not to suggest that this understanding might be reciprocal in 
any way.88 Thus actually becoming an independent reasoner is the essential part of what 
constitutes moral worth. Realizing communicative ability in responsive interaction is 
what really counts.  
 
Two possible but conflicting interpretations of MacIntyre’s approach to our animality 
therefore emerge that will yield different valuations of the animal and bodily side of our 
nature: 
 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 6. 
86 Ibid., 140. 
87 Ibid., 57-58. 
88 Ibid., 14. 
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1) A rational disposition within our animality 
In this interpretation rationality is a part of our animality and not a product of external 
forces.89 We are born social in our original untutored state: “I am my body and my body 
is social, born to those parents in this community with a specific social identity.”90 Thus 
rationality as such is to be understood as a distinctive potentiality of our species, 
regardless of external forces. Rationality is part of our telos nature as a disposition, even 
as infants. Infants as a result may not be considered equal to or compared to other animals 
in degrees of rationality. Rationality as a potential exists independent of but in league 
with our social nature within our animality. We must ‘dissociate’ from physical 
appearance and presentation, but as long as the subject is part of the human species, 
rationality is necessarily part of its nature. We should have ‘regard’ for each individual, 
and positive feelings of empathy should be embraced on account of our common origin. 
Hence we are all inherently different and culture is a product of this difference. The body 
and its form is thus a sign of who we are as persons.  
 
2) A irrational animality 
Rationality is external and secondary to our animality. Our animality needs external 
(social) redirection for rationality to develop.91 Infants are much like other animals, and 
rationality must be given to them from the outside. There is no rationality separate from 
society, no disposition to rationality other than what is produced by contingent social 
evolution. Realizing our telos as rational animals is hence a historical accident, a random 
evolutionary event. Imperfect social relationships and conflicts are normal, rationality is 
something to be hoped for but by no means guaranteed. We all thus need outside 
influence from culture to become different and to develop self-awareness. The source of 
self and difference lies outside of the person in the social control or tutoring of our 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 5. 
90 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 172. 
91 “Our second culturally formed language-using nature is a set of partial, but only partial, transformations 
of our first animal nature.” MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 
49. 
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physical (or animal) aspects. We are subsequently cultural products,92 and bodily 
difference i.e. disability, might/should be overcome. Negative feelings that arise from 
confronting ugliness and disfigurement are illogical and should be suppressed.93  The 
body consequently is not a sign of who we are as persons.94  
 
The difference between these positions is not raised explicitly as a matter of argument by 
MacIntyre, but it seems fair to understand him to be at least dominated by the second 
position. In the struggle to achieve virtue ‘the body’ of an agent, understood both as his 
animality and his unrefined ‘nature’, is for MacIntyre, an antagonist.95 Being virtuous is 
opposed to being subjected to raw emotions and desires,96 but as our nature is refined 
through virtue, the status of our emotions and desires is supposed to change with us, so 
that we in the end desire to do what virtue demands. A particular problem in relation to 
conflicting desires not raised by MacIntyre in this context is the ‘acratic’, and our 
freedom and necessity with regard to the possibilities of choice of character. However it 
seems fair to assume that reason is supposed to direct (raw) passion, and that conflict 
between reason and passion is supposed to be resolved in favor of reason. Reason 
consequently is the judge of our passions and if our passions are inappropriate they must 
be continuously re-formed according to our social nature.97
 
A problem of teleology? 
Does MacIntyre’s understanding of raw animality characterized by position 2) follow 
from having a teleological viewpoint? No, it does not. It rather follows from the more 
specific Aristotelian teleology or biology as MacIntyre understands it.98 General 
teleology in MacIntyre’s understanding has 3 central elements: 
                                                 
92 “character is imposed from the outside”, MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 29.  “Man 
without culture is a myth.”161 
93 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 137. 
94 “We therefore need to learn how to dissociate the evaluation of personal qualities and of reasoning from 
physical appearance and from manner of presentation. Ibid. 
95 Both in Ibid. And in MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 
96 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 68. 
97 “ The child has to learn that it may have good reason to act other than as its most urgently felt wants 
dictate and it can do this only when those wants have ceased to be its dictator.” Ibid., 69, se also 73. 
98 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 52-54. 
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1) Untutored human nature, 
2) Man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos, 
3) The moral precepts required to pass from 1) to 2). 
 
The difference here lies in the understanding of untutored human nature. If the 
understanding of untutored human nature in 1) is too negative with regard to rationality, 
‘the body’ emerges as a negative dictator of passions and irrationality. However, this 
understanding is not inherent in teleology or Virtue Ethics, but instead the result of a 
conception of the human telos as something that must be developed in opposition to the 
‘badness’ of the (human) body. The problem thus seems to be that MacIntyre here 
remains unable to reevaluate the traditional negativity of the body, and not teleology or 
Virtue Ethics in general. This problem of valuation occurs again and again in the texts as 
MacIntyre’s appraisal of the Aristotelian biology shifts from negative to positive and 
sporadically back again. Even in After Virtue, where he is negative to Aristotelian biology 
MacIntyre’s view is revealing: “… from an Aristotelian standpoint, reason cannot be the 
servant of the passions. For the education of the passions into conformity with pursuit of 
what theoretical reasoning identifies as the telos and practical reasoning as the right 
action to do in each particular time and place is what ethics is about.”99
 
Sources of moral failure 
What according to MacIntyre are the sources of moral failure? If being an independent 
reasoner is the telos of our nature as dependent rational animals, what is it that prevents 
us from realizing this part of our nature? MacIntyre’s argument is structured to convey 
that if we accept his understanding of ‘Just Generosity’ as a sort of universal attitude of 
friendship, failure to become virtuous will reveal itself in the same manner as failures to 
be or have a friend. To understand and to learn about the good of friendship you rely on a 
previous social practice of friendship to learn from. There must be a developed 
understanding of the difference between seeming to be a friend, and being a friend. This 
understanding subsequently constitutes the moral tradition of the relevant virtue(s) in a 
                                                 
99 Ibid., 162.  
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particular society where the social history of the moral outlook appropriate to a virtue is 
reproduced or represented by its institutions: art, science, law, politics, family, etc. As a 
particular practice changes with the people that share in this practice and the history of 
this practice, the institutions will also change. Therefore each particular virtue and each 
evaluation of a practice or an institution are interconnected. Each is explainable only in 
light of the other, and an evaluation of someone’s performance is only possible within 
this context. Much more could here be said about the political100 level of MacIntyre’s 
argument and his polemic against positions of ‘ironic’ withdrawal from society, but this 
would probably not contribute towards a better understanding of ‘the body’, and I will 
therefore let that rest for now. 
 
Culture vs. biology 
The deeper problem in the virtue account of the moral subject is just this opposition of 
animality vs. society and culture. As long as the creation of the (virtuous) self is supposed 
to take place as a refinement of an initial animal condition that is seen as pre-society and 
pre-moral, animality is in danger of being the pollutant in the understanding of the moral 
subject. The emphasis by MacIntyre on the initial animal condition that is shared by 
infants and other animals alike, gives the project of virtue an inherent drive to remove the 
self from this animality. It is thus in danger of becoming a tale of ‘original sin’ and of 
cultural suppression of our ‘animalistic’ tendencies. This danger is not removed by the 
naturalness of the virtuous self or the human telos, even though it is possible to force an 
interpretation of MacIntyre so that rationality is considered to be part of our animality 
(position 1). It is not just crude nature vs. culture that emerges as the problem in how 
MacIntyre understands virtue. Additionally it has become a problem within our refined 
nature as well, that moral development is seen in the context of an opposition of 
animalistic (badness) vs. cultural (goodness).101 Becoming a virtuous person through the 
creation of your own narrative and your own character, with sufficient luck and help from 
others, has as its central feature a seemingly necessary denial of one’s animalistic origin. 
                                                 
100 “Attitudes of regard” i.e. friendship, are political attitudes. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: 
Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 141.  
101 For instance: Ibid., 49 and 147. 
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Whether this denial in a ‘psychoanalytical’ perspective amounts to a denial of death or of 
sexuality etc., will of course depend on the culture in question and its particular idea of 
the good.102 Controlling ‘bodily’ affects, overcoming initial vulnerability,103 creating 
confidence in our ‘true’ selves in the face of animalistic necessitation, are all strategies of 
becoming virtuous according to MacIntyre (and other virtue theorist’s). And even though 
MacIntyre insists that ‘we are our bodies’104 it is clear from his understanding of ‘the 
body’ that being a body is something that needs to be negotiated and overcome. Since the 
initial animal condition of ‘disability’ is shared by all, difference emerges as a product of 
culture and chance, and failure to acknowledge how this initial dependence and 
vulnerability affects us all is in fact a failure to acknowledge the ‘badness’ of the initial 
condition.  
 
The most revealing example of the focal point of MacIntyre’s project of acknowledged 
dependence is his insistence on the ‘maternal’ closeness to this natural vulnerability, and 
how ‘men need to become more like women’.105 Intending to argue for the necessity of 
understanding humans in light of our fragility and vulnerability as creatures with bodies, 
MacIntyre as a consequence, ends up in an understanding of culture as necessarily being 
constructed by and through a denial of this precondition, and thus in opposition to such 
animality. His understanding of the feminine or the maternal as more in touch with our 
animality just serves to further underline this opposition. Culture for all intents and 
purposes becomes the product of the domestication of infants inseparable from the 
domestication of other animals.106 Essentially, a ‘better’ culture that is more in accord 
with the ‘maternal’ insight into our animality would be better suited to hold our animality 
at bay. We have thus failed to remove ourselves from necessitation and animal fragility 
                                                 
102 It is likely that MacIntyre would himself be unhappy to see this as a consequence of his position, 
compare: MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 124. 
103 For instance: MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 73. 
104 Ibid., 6. 
105 Ibid., 164. 
106 It seems fair to use the word ‘domestication’ here on account of how MacIntyre describes both the 
training of dogs and the social practices of human and non-human interaction. Ibid., 16 and 31-32. 
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‘in the right manner’.107 This end result is of course in clear contrast to a more successful 
project of removing the “silliness of Descartes”,108 that for instance, might locate the 
source of difference and plurality (with)-in/as our bodies. Bodily differences might then 
be acknowledged as one of many equally significant sources of differences which 
influence who we are. MacIntyre’s insistence on our negative embodiment, as in the 
embodiment of our true self in bodily dictatorship, fails to see the self as indivisible from 
the body or animality, and therefore ends up in a perspective where this animality is a 
fixed negative influence on our being. The possibility of correcting our reasoning with 
‘passion’ almost disappears. On the other hand, there are tendencies in the interpretations 
of achieving virtue as becoming someone with the ‘right desires’ that gives the 
animalistic side of our being a more positive spin. Nevertheless the emphasis is again on 
the need for culture or rationality109 to control and purify our desire formation even with 
the virtuous.  Thus the correctness of MacIntyre’s project to emphasize the necessity of 
acknowledging our animality and the dialectic of dependence and independence is 
undermined by his treatment of this animality as the antithesis of culture and morality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 A minor point is the manipulative nature of such domestication in view of his sharp critique of the 
manipulative nature of such modern characters as the bureaucratic manager and the therapist.  
108 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, 13-14. 
109 Ibid., 54. 
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The Ethics of Care 
The Ethics of Care is the latest alternative in contemporary debates on moral problems. 
The care perspective is advocated as giving yet more attention to close relations and 
biologically founded vulnerability than the Virtue perspective. Additionally many of the 
central aspects focus explicitly on biological differences and their significance or lack 
thereof in moral valuations and worth. Its proponents usually find this to be a particular 
strength within the care perspective when compared to Kantian or Virtue inspired 
approaches to specific problems as for instance abortion and organ transplantation. 
 
What is the Ethics of Care? 
What is ‘Ethics of Care’? At the outset an Ethics of Care might be characterized as an 
effort to critically examine (contemporary) society with an eye to the phenomena of care 
and dependency and their distribution. The perspectives range from meta-ethics to 
nursing, from ‘object-relations’ psychology to politics, and are generally influenced by 
‘feminism’; which in this context is an understanding that care and caretaking is more 
visible from a woman’s perspective, and better portrays the world as experienced by 
women. The advocates of an Ethics of Care subsequently differ in their perspectives in 
manners comparable to differences within feminism, but my purpose here is not to 
discuss the merits of feminism or whether the Ethics of Care is rightly to be seen as a part 
of feminism. Outlooks within care ethics may vary from the Aristotelian to the liberal or 
revolutionary political, and this makes it difficult to pinpoint a specific quality in the care 
perspective that merits singling it out as a different branch of ethics.  It is nevertheless at 
least the name of an ‘area of debate’ within contemporary ethics and thus merits serious 
consideration as it highlights a relational aspect of morality as well as questions 
concerning the justice and distribution of care that generally are taken to be left out of 
more ‘traditional’ moral theories.  
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In the following I will examine two different positions within the Ethics of Care 
represented by Joan C. Tronto in Moral Boundaries110 and Eva Feder Kittay in Love’s 
Labor,111 with an eye to how ‘the body’ of the moral subject (patient) appears in the 
context of their discussion of an Ethics of Care. Since Kittay’s work is regarded by 
MacIntyre to be an important inspiration for his discussion on dependency and 
vulnerability, her work adds an interesting light on the position of MacIntyre as well. 
 
What is care? 
Alternative definitions of care thrive but as a starting point the definition given by Joan 
C. Tronto should be helpful: “On the most general level, we suggest that caring be 
viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and 
repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our 
bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, 
life-sustaining web.”112
 
This general definition suggests an understanding of care as an ongoing activity as well 
as signaling a cultural practice or a disposition. Both elements are equally important to 
give care its different political and virtuous aspects. As a result care is understood as both 
a virtuous disposition and intended to be a form of consequentialism making the 
caregiver and the care-receiver (charge) mutually responsible for the outcome. The 
political aspect of care is highlighted by Toronto in a discussion on how to assess which 
needs are worthy of care, and how this is a question that must be answered within a 
liberal conception of politics and justice.113 This is especially important if the needs of 
the caregiver are to be taken care of and if the caregiver is to be protected from 
exploitation by both the cared for and others that may avoid care work because of the 
caregivers efforts. Thus assuring that care is given, and securing caregivers from possible 
                                                 
110 Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 
1993). 
111 Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, Thinking Gender (New 
York: Routledge, 1999). 
112 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 103. 
113 Especially Ibid., 145-55. 
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exploitation are both important aspects of care ethics. Hence Tronto does not want to 
discard a traditional liberal understanding of justice, but instead argues that the 
perspective from care needs to be added to this tradition to improve the liberal outlook. 
 
The central perspectives within the Ethics of Care as viewed by Tronto are: 
1. Vulnerability:  all human beings share the condition of being vulnerable, only the 
degrees of vulnerability will change throughout our lives due to differences in our 
(biological and social) circumstances. 
2. (Inter-)Dependency: all humans are equally dependent on others. The degrees of 
our dependencies will differ, due to changing circumstances throughout our lives. 
A particular dependency exists between those who take care of their dependents 
and the rest of society. Such derived dependencies as the dependency of the 
caregiver are often described as nested dependencies. 
3. Relationships: the need for care and the call upon the caregiver to give originates 
in relationships that often are involuntary, unequal and unrelated to the activity of 
care-giving. 
All three perspectives are also intended to signify the biological basis and 
interdependence of each. 
 
It follows that much of the perspective on care and care-giving is designed to highlight 
the particular role of the caregiver and how special responsibilities and characteristics of 
the caregiver’s situation make the caregiver vulnerable to exploitation from others. This 
perspective is also intended to reflect how caregivers are understood to be predominantly 
female at least in contemporary society, and how many of the particular aspects of the 
caregiver’s situation are gendered and consequently unjustly distributed. 
 
The perspective on care as a result conflicts with traditional perspectives on liberal ethics 
that see independence and autonomy as the normal condition or fundamental goal for 
personhood. Arguments for equality or social justice within the care perspectives 
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emphasize how such ‘liberal’ view’s will be inadequate to reflect the unequal social 
positions of dependents and caregivers as an inevitable feature to any society on account 
of our biology. Inevitable dependencies and vulnerabilities arise through the natural track 
of all human life, and our ideas of justice and personhood should reflect this 
understanding. Dependence and vulnerability thus has a better claim to be understood as 
more fundamental to our lives than (liberal) ideas of ‘self-sufficiency’. The ability of 
someone to achieve a degree of independence and autonomy is always the result of the 
support and care given by particular others, especially parents, and any ethical theories 
that ignore this in favor of ideas of independence and self-sufficiency, do this to the 
detriment of caregivers and their importance in society. Since caregivers within the 
modern family usually are women, it follows that this ignorance comes at the expense of 
the recognition of their important contribution to sustaining society in general. However, 
it is also important to highlight that the degree to which this may be taken as giving an 
essentialist understanding of women’s role in society is contested within the tradition of 
care ethics. The gendered nature of the current distribution of care work has tempted 
descriptions of care ethics as ‘feminine morality’, thus understanding the distribution of 
care work to follow necessary gendered lines. Tronto is emphatic that such essentialist 
understanding of women and care as ‘women’s morality’ is a mistake and that other 
political perspectives as race and class are just as important to care ethics.114
 
Another central aspect of Tronto’s care perspective is the question of how to understand 
the split between public and private spheres in relation to the current gendered 
distribution of care work. Conceptions of the family as gendered and as the primarily 
private arena for intimacy and care work is seen as one of several ideas about gender and 
dependency that serve to keep the care perspectives out of the public eye and out of 
bounds for questions about justice and the (proper) arena of the political. Joan Tronto115 
thus emphasizes the need to refine this ‘traditional’ division of perspective between the 
public vs. private spheres to be able to bring the distribution of care and dependency into 
                                                 
114 Ibid., chp.2-3. 
115 Ibid. 
 
Vollan 43 
a political context. Tronto’s stress on the need to reexamine the understanding of women 
and care as part of a ‘natural’ private sphere also contributes to her resistance towards 
understanding care as essentially a female quality and her argument against a gendered 
understanding of morality. Opposing an understanding of care as specific reasoning 
particular to women inside the private family, Tronto instead argues that our 
understanding of care should focus on care as implying both political action and a 
virtuous practice and disposition.116 The notion of practice is suggestive of the cultural 
outlook of Tronto’s predominantly liberal care theory, and how what we care about is the 
result of our culturally shaped positions. 
 
Tronto’s four phases of care 
Tronto outlines four interconnected phases of care to support our understanding of care as 
an ongoing activity:117
1. Caring about: recognizing a specific need for care, and following this recognition 
with a want to satisfy this particular need. 
2. Taking care of: determining how a particular need is met. 
3. Care giving: actually meeting this need. 
4. Care-receiving: a response to care. 
 
Even though Tronto with some reluctance points to ‘mothering’ as paradigmatic for how 
we should understand care as a practice in our society (and culture), care is not for Tronto 
related to any particular quality of the object cared for. The aspect of ‘response’ in phase 
four for this reason does not indicate that there should be an understanding of the 
recipient of care as an (potential) agent. The terminology of care fits equally well to care 
for material objects: “the repair person fixing the broken thing”118 or for the 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 103-05. 
117 Ibid., 106-07. 
118 Ibid., 107. 
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environment119 and the world in general: “…when a practice is aimed at maintaining, 
continuing, or repairing the world.”120 The returned response should be seen more as the 
care having some form of impact or effect, and who cares or what is cared for depends on 
the cultural context of the care practice.121
 
In addition to the four phases of care Tronto identifies four ethical elements of care that 
are to be taken as integrated:122
1. Attentiveness: sensitivity, and a concomitant openness to be affected by needs 
that arise around you. This openness should especially be towards the needs of 
others. 
2. Responsibility:  a flexible understanding of how the needs that come to your 
attention should be met and by whom. What you in particular are responsible for 
is shaped by your political outlook, individual psychology and cultural practices. 
3. Competence: you should make sure that the care you give is competent, that it 
comes as close as possible to the desired result. 
4. Responsiveness: the charge’s own understanding (if any) of what should be taken 
care of should be given primacy in the care-giving process. 
 
These four elements together make up the practical basis of judgment within care (thus 
constituting care’s phronesis). Again her emphasis is on how care needs to be seen in a 
larger political and cultural context, and how the care practice depends on our particular 
situatedness. 
 
                                                 
119 A minor but puzzling point related to this definition is that it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish 
between activities of for instance farming (tending to cattle and pasture) and activities of nursing if this 
definition of care is used as the sole criteria for identifying care work in society. Thus the gender 
inequalities that are identifiable from the perspective of Tronto’s definition of care may be significantly 
fewer in number than she intends. 
120 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 104. 
121 Ibid., 110.  A similar position to ‘response’ is sometimes hinted at in Kittay: “Those creatures to which 
we have given much care, or from which we have received care are ones to which we tend to bond. Such 
bonding can perhaps be extended to nonsentient beings in a unidirectional fashion, such as ties we feel 
toward physical landscapes which have comforted or nurtured us and in which we have invested care.” 
Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, footnote 71, 196. 
122 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 127-37. 
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Once the required understanding of the phases and elements of care and their connection 
is achieved it should thus be possible to examine critically how the practice of care is 
structured in our society and culture, and accordingly redraw the moral and political 
boundaries in our society, especially the split between public and private spheres. This 
process should make us question how politics has been related to ‘interests’, to 
independent ‘universality’, and ‘the public’ in ways that otherwise might have remained 
hidden or seen as natural, and thereby in ways hindering justice for both caregivers and 
their dependents.123
 
Tronto’s call for a more caring liberalism remains a predominantly political and 
revisionist argument vs. traditional ‘liberal’ political outlooks. She strongly criticizes the 
shortcomings of both the traditional ‘liberal’ position, and she makes an equally strong 
case against the political implications of other strands of care ethics that from her 
perspective only manages to reverse the positions of ‘male’ ethics into an equally 
problematic ‘woman’s morality’. 
 
The relational strength of the Ethics of Care 
In contrast to Joan Tronto and her predominantly political perspective, Eva Feder Kittay 
in Love’s Labor,124 presents a perspective that is partly an extension of Tronto’s and 
additionally more focused on care’s ‘private’ and affective aspects. Her emphasis is on 
the particular nested relationships that we find ourselves part of, and on the specific 
biological basis of some of the dependencies that we necessarily are confronted with. 
Highlighting the possibility of severe disability as open to all she points towards a new 
understanding of need, dependency and vulnerability that does not consider this 
possibility to be socially or culturally constructed.125 Furthermore, our response to these 
facts is (or should be) connection based in a way that recognizes our interconnectedness 
but does not look for mutuality or reciprocity in the foundation of relationships. Both the 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 178. 
124 Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. 
125 Ibid., 180. 
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need to care and the need for care is described as found in the paradigmatic relationship 
of being some “mother’s child”.126  
 
Echoing Tronto, Kittay makes feminism and care ethics’ probably strongest point when 
she directs our attention to how certain conceptions of morality and politics have been 
erroneously structured by accentuating special ideas of persons and their status: “To 
uncritically accept certain persons as the norm is to accept the status quo as 
fundamentally nonproblematic. But the inclusionary nature of the ideal of equality 
reveals the difficulty of its realization where the perspective of those who are dominant 
hold sway, where the norms which stand behind principles of universality and 
impartiality go unquestioned, and where status quo is complacently accepted.”127 Thus 
she is partially making a demand for equality in the liberal vein, and partially making a 
critique of equality at the same time, questioning traditional conceptions of ‘liberal’ man, 
his independence, universality and self-sufficiency. 
 
Her own approach to the concept of a person is to locate the basis of equality outside the 
individual in the relation between the individual and her mother. Frustrating the charge 
for this reason simultaneously frustrates and dishonors the care that this individual’s 
mother has invested. As a result the call to moral responsibility is found in the mother-
child relationship, and not within the charge. Both the caregiver and the charge are 
additionally to be understood as vulnerable to each other, equally some ‘mother’s child’. 
The relationship of care is however unavoidably between two unequal individuals: “The 
inequality between worker and charge is one of capacity, although it may also be one of 
social status and even of power over life and death. Though the two may not even be 
moral equals – the charge may well be temporarily or permanently incapable of a moral 
response – the relation, at its very crux, is a moral one arising out of a claim of 
vulnerability on the part of the dependent, on the one hand, and of the special positioning 
of the dependency worker to meet the need, on the other.”128  
                                                 
126 Ibid., 23 and onwards. 
127 Ibid., 6. 
128 Ibid., 35. 
Vollan 47 
 
Kittay hence explicitly constructs the ideal of the dependency worker’s (motivational) 
self as a contrast to what she sees as the “rational self-interested liberal self”.129 This 
‘transparent self’ of the dependency worker is also highly idealized and borders on 
sainthood as it is required to see the needs of another first, its own needs second: “…- a 
self through whom the needs of another are discerned, a self that, when it looks to gauge 
its own needs, sees first the needs of another.”130 The central point here is that in a 
dependency or care relation the idea of the ‘transparent self’ is indispensable in order to 
preserve the interests of the charge. Her understanding of the self of the caregiver thus 
raises some of the same concerns as Tronto’s four elements of care (as seen above). 
The salient points for Kittay in outlining the relationships that involve care are that the 
relationships are given in a sense that is different from relationships of choice. They are 
often non-voluntary, but should also be understood as non-coerced, they should not be the 
result of a previous injustice. One example used of such a relationship is kinship. It is not 
unreasonable for kin to expect help from you if you are in a position to give and they are 
in need; and this expectation is at least in our culture unrelated to the fact that your 
kinship relations are not chosen by you, or that ‘non-kin’ might be in an equal or even 
better position to help than you. 
 
In order to preserve justice in relation to care-giving for those unable to respond i.e. 
reciprocate, Kittay introduces her concept of doulia: “…, the concept of social 
cooperation that derives from the Greek word for service: Just as we have required care 
to survive and thrive, so we need to provide conditions that allow others – including 
those who do the work of caring – to receive the care they need to survive and thrive.”131 
Thus circles of reciprocity are to be established as a basis of welfare in larger social 
structures, giving the larger society the obligation to provide for the well-being of the 
caregiver. This extended principle of doulia should be understood not as equalizing goods 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 52. 
130 Ibid., 51. 
131 Ibid., 133. 
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or resources, but instead equalizing capabilities,132 care if we become dependent, support 
if we have to care for others, and assurance that others will care for our dependents if we 
are unable due to our own dependencies.133
 
A problematic origin 
Eva Feder Kittay admits to a strong inspiration from the rethinking of moral selves and 
objectivity that is done by Carol Gilligan in In a Different Voice,134 a work often taken to 
instigate the Ethics of Care standpoint, and consequently she also seems susceptible to 
some of problems that are entwined with this work. Even though Gilligan and Kittay both 
insist that there is nothing inherently gendered in the care perspective135 these problems 
within care all seem to be connected to a specific understanding of gender and the family. 
The psychological foundation of care ethics as inherited from Gilligan’s discussion, still 
balances on an understanding of the psychological-developmental mechanisms of 
‘separation and connection’ vs. others, as oppositional and divisive along gendered 
lines.136 This understanding thus emphasizes gender to the detriment of alternative 
biological and social foundations of care perspectives, and gives the care perspective an 
inherent gendered slant. Even though these difficulties sometimes are openly 
acknowledged137 they are still evident within the work of both Tronto and Kittay, 
especially in their reluctance to admit the viewpoint of protection into care ethics. This 
reluctance is understandable, as they both seem to associate the need for protection with 
                                                 
132 ”… the ability to realize those functionings we deem valuable.” Ibid., 179.  
This perspective on capabilities however comes with its own set of distinct difficulties, of which the most 
apparent is the use of ‘capability’ concepts in the perspective of caring for the very old, the demented and 
the dying. 
133 Ibid., 132. 
134 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
135 For instance: Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, xiii. Gilligan, In a 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, 2. (Compare with Tronto, Moral 
Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, Part two. ) 
136 The necessarily erotic and gendered understanding of the dialectic of submission and dominance, 
sameness and difference, remains unquestioned. Alternative perspectives as for instance age disappear. 
137 “So too Gilligan’s work is not value neutral but is informed by how object-relations psychology 
conceives of the self. But the problem with this view of psychological development is that it makes gender 
the only relevant category of difference.” Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of 
Care, 81. 
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‘male aggression’ and male ways of being in the world,138 but they also subsequently 
miss out on the possibility of understanding differences in dependency and vulnerability 
within genders. Their understanding of care thus fails to acknowledge how for instance 
the common army private is nested in a range of dependencies and possibly risks 
exploitation on an equal level to other dependency workers.  
 
Only positive personal affections? 
On a more curious note it is at times difficult to understand the tendency within the care 
perspective to only find positive affection arising in relationships of need, dependency, 
closeness, vulnerability and affliction. This amounts to a reemergence of the essentialist 
understanding of the ‘mother’ or dependency worker as always and endlessly positive. A 
natural account of negative feelings in close relationships of care disappears, or is pushed 
into the ‘limitations’ of care-receivers (infants) and taken to be arising outside of the 
caregiver. This phenomenon might again stem from the problematic origin of care ethics 
in psychological development theories139 where the ‘good mother’ is understood as 
someone who always endures aggression and destruction without retaliation or retreat, 
and as such is only the mirror image of the patriarchal ‘good father’. Our affections, 
which arise in ‘close’ relationships, thus influence the moral understanding of these 
relationships, only in so far that they are good. Affections are also restricted so that they 
can only be valid when species specific. Both Tronto’s definition of care as a “species 
specific”140 activity (see above) and Kittay’s attitude is revealing - “The kiss I share with 
another human is distinctively human. I argue that to reduce what makes us persons to a 
set of defined characteristics is a mistake.”141 This is indicative that care in the deepest 
sense is limited to ‘persons’ after all, in spite of definitions and arguments to the contrary. 
 
                                                 
138 Ibid., 104 - 05. Especially negative is Kittay: Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and 
Dependency, 41. 
139 For instance: Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, 45-47, 
98. 
140 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 103. 
141 Kittay in: “When Caring Is Just and Justice Is Caring”, in Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder, The 
Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, Feminist Constructions (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 207. 
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The traditional family, not so bad after all? 
The (‘middle class’) family is often presented as the primary site of care within the care 
ethics perspective. This primacy is somewhat surprising since much of the analysis of the 
family is focused on the exploitative possibilities and realities that are seen as inherent in 
our current understanding of family and familial relations.142 Nevertheless the 
understanding is that close affective or kinship ties, arising in a traditional family, give a 
privileged understanding of the needs and vulnerabilities of the charge. Other 
perspectives from for instance friendship or professionalism within nursing which 
through avoiding over-involvement, might give better care in a consequential sense are 
downplayed. Thus families as we understand them today as harboring heterosexual 
parents and their children, again are essentialized, and emerge as the correct or proper 
breeding ground for caring relationships. Hence the ‘liberal’ values of privacy and 
independence for the family are reasserted. It is taken for granted that care is a property 
of the ‘inheritance’ in familial relations directing for instance taking care of elders - that 
‘blood is thicker’ after all. On the other hand, some of the imagery that is presented of the 
ideal caring society might be taken as somehow overruling the primacy of blood 
relationships or kinship in favor of a stronger more ‘maternal’ state.  
 
Why your ‘mother’? 
The positive and important core of the Ethics of Care is found in the way it brings to light 
the importance of particular relationships, and how they are foundational to our ideas of 
the self and society. The quandary of Kittay (contrary to Tronto143) is however, that the 
                                                 
142 Especially Tronto’s analysis of ‘traditional’ valuations as well as Gilligan’s perspective is revealing, but 
Tronto repeatedly asserts how the needs to be given priority are culturally determined and how the right 
thing to care about thus actually is what we already care about in our culture or just a little more so. ”Needs 
are culturally determined; if some people in society seem to have disproportionate needs, that is a matter for 
the individuals in the society to evaluate and perhaps to change.” Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political 
Argument for an Ethic of Care, 171. 
143 Assessing Tronto’s contribution on this particular point is difficult. She argues against much of object-
relations psychology and also against essentializing care as ‘women’s morality’, nevertheless, if we take 
seriously her definition of care as primarily not interested in the status of the ‘charge’, the only other source 
of motivation left for caring are our current cultural practices, and thus part of Tronto’s perspective here 
works to reinforce the status quo of the liberal conception of the family. Esp. Ibid., 147 - 55. But also: 
“Ultimately, responsibility to care might rest on a number of factors; something we did or did not do has 
contributed to the need for care, and so we must care. For example, if we are the parents of children, having 
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primacy of the mother-child relation as in “some mother’s child” is only asserted, not 
argued for. Here Kittay again relies on an essentialist understanding of ‘mothering’ and 
gender that reveals its problematic origin in developmental psychology.144 In this context 
the main difficulty within this type of psychology is its ‘top to bottom’ construction, only 
mirroring the problem previously assigned to ‘male-psychology’ of casting one genders 
adult experiences in contemporary society as ‘the rule’ and the other genders’ 
experiences as ‘the exception’,145 and thus missing the ‘post-conventional’146 
understanding of morality that is aimed for in the care ethics project as introduced by 
Gilligan. The fate of care ethics thus is linked to a highly contested part of 
developmental-psychology that takes as natural a current (and sometimes desired) 
‘splitting’ within traditional families along gendered and sexual lines. Instead of being 
taken as fundamental this ‘splitting’ of gender and power might have been questioned 
more carefully if Tronto’s arguments to remove care ethics from its origins in 
psychological theory had been given more weight in accounts similar to Kittay’s. 
 
Revisiting ‘the body’ 
The care approach promises to give larger attention to the perspective of those who are at 
risk of exploitation due to unjust distribution of care work on account of gender, but also 
race and class. Gender, equally with race and class, is thus within this perspective, a 
political or social category independent of the self, and not primarily a bodily or physical 
perspective on the self. Tronto especially focuses on the seemingly constructed and 
cultural basis of this inequality in a revealing manner:  
 
A vicious circle operates here: care is devalued and the people who do caring work are 
devalued. Not only are these positions poorly paid and not prestigious, but the 
association of people with bodies lowers their value. Those who are thought of as 
                                                                                                                                                 
become parents entails the responsibility of caring for these particular children.” Tronto, Moral Boundaries: 
A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 132. 
144 A minor point here is that it also becomes difficult with this approach to point to any difference between 
humans and other mammals. 
145 Compare: Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, 46-63. 
146 Ibid., 100. 
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“others” in society are often thought of in bodily terms: they are described by their 
physical conditions, they are considered “dirty”, they are considered more “natural.” 
Thus the ideological descriptions of “people of color” and of ”women” (as if such 
categories existed) often stress their “natural” qualities: in dominant American culture, 
Blacks have a sense of rhythm and women are naturally more nurturant and 
emotional.147
 
Kittay’s approach on the other hand wants to understand a politically and psychologically 
constructed relation, being a ‘mother’s child,’ as something natural and hence also 
physical, reinvigorating the essentialism of Gilligan’s perspective which Tronto criticizes. 
The old debate of ‘nature vs. nurture’ thus has reappeared within the care perspective. 
This is not surprising since it is probably fair to all of the perspectives mentioned, from 
Gilligan and object-relation psychology via Joan Tronto to Kittay, to understand their use 
of the concept of gender as something culturally constructed and contingent to the subject 
of care. The underlying and reinforced position is that gender is valued either as male or 
female because of its constructedness, or more bluntly: because it is taken as a matter of 
culture and not a matter of biology. And hence seeing also the significance of the 
differences between the ‘disabled’ or the ‘able’ as a matter of interpretation, i.e. 
‘mothers’ are in general less disabled than ‘fathers’, the argument reinforces cultural 
interpretation as more important than ‘bodily’ dependencies, not less. The question is not 
the charges or your physical aspects, but the moral subject’s social and cultural 
construction along political ‘boundaries’ of exclusion or inclusion. The perspective of the 
physical/body of the moral subject is thus in danger of disappearing in favor of for 
instance race, class or gender as fully constructed and sometimes even substitutable 
categories. This aspect of feminism and care ethics should at least caution us against any 
perspective on the self that does not explicitly acknowledge the difficulties in trying to do 
without the dualisms of gender or ‘mind/body’ that prevail in our culture and discourse. 
 
                                                 
147 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 114. 
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Situatedness vs. the body, or the body as a site 
A definite strength of the Ethics of Care is nevertheless its understanding of the moral 
subject as necessarily situated and different from categories such as ‘the ego’ or 
‘mankind’. The charge and the caregiver are both understood as being in a particular 
place, in a particular time, and in relationships to particular others. This emphasis on the 
situation, spatially, temporally and otherwise, as a result contributes to make the 
uniqueness of the individual more visible to ethical judgments. Consequently, as this 
uniqueness is linked to the entire situation of the individual, relationships and affections, 
capacities both corporal and intellectual may after all emerge as more important than 
‘self-interested’ reciprocity. Care ethics from this perspective encompasses more of our 
intuitive understanding of morality than say, the narrow utilitarianism and ego-motivation 
that is ascribed to ‘the liberal’ intellectualist point of view, since it allows ‘the physical’ 
aspects of emotions and desires to influence what we care about. This strength within the 
care perspective is not removed by the evident limits to its tendency to cast gender (or 
birthing) as the only or primary bodily ‘feature’ of relevance to the moral subject.148 If 
this somewhat overpowering perspective from gender may be overcome, the relational 
aspect of care ethics promises an interesting perspective on personhood and practical 
moral reasoning. An understanding that provides a rational explanation of why care of 
‘the body’ even in the explicit absence of intellect, or capacities, might be warranted from 
a moral point of view.  
 
On the other hand a tendency is also evident within care ethics which turn ‘the body’ into 
a mere ‘site’ of the self, and thus only significant as an outer boundary for the ‘psyche’; 
and we are again left with only a limited intellectualist understanding of the self that fails 
to provide a perspective on ‘the body’ and physical differences. One example is how ‘the 
body’ is sometimes understood as a mere ‘expression’ of the self. Both primitive and 
sophisticated practices of manipulation towards the body often reveal attitudes that take 
                                                 
148 There is of course also the additional problem of whether gender or sex is socially or biologically 
constituted. Evidence from experiences with ‘intersex’ (scrambled chromosomal patterns and dual or 
diverging genital development) today is taken to signal a definite biological foundation of gender and sex in 
opposition to previously popular ideas about social constructivism. See for instance: Kittay and Feder, The 
Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency, 294 - 320. 
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‘the body’ as a site. A prime example within feminist literature that reveals much 
ambivalence is ‘anorexia’. Other examples might be culturally founded ‘genital 
mutilation’, cosmetic plastic surgery or our contemporary focus on fitness and health. 
The rightness or wrongness of such practices from the perspective of care or feminism 
oscillates as the result is judged to be either demeaning or empowering. Also lost in this 
perspective is how one might just as well turn the relationship between ‘body’ and ‘mind’ 
around and ask how ‘the body’ expresses (its) self in thought and through ‘the mind’. 
Mutual ‘articulation’ is here probably a more useful approach than awarding primacy to 
one over the other.  
 
 
Final thoughts 
In comparing these three different approaches to ethics with regard to the understanding 
of ‘the body’ we are unlikely to find one clear answer to our questions concerning 
(medical) triage. Nevertheless we should now be able to point out certain advantages and 
disadvantages. Care ethics starts with the explicit intention to give more room for 
perspectives linked to affective relationships and some underlying bodily and gendered 
features. Subsequently this relational approach makes it necessary to give more weight to 
‘the body’ in our deliberation on bio-ethical dilemmas than before, even in the absence of 
consciousness or life. It matters how we treat people after death as well as before life 
ends. 
 
MacIntyre wants to overcome Cartesian dualism and to give a voice to those unable to 
speak on their own behalf, the severely disabled. Nonetheless MacIntyre’s position 
reveals a much more negative perspective on ‘the body’ and our bodily aspects than I 
expected. MacIntyre and Virtue Ethics end up reemphasizing culture and society as 
having the final word on what is important, and although this in some cultures will entail 
giving substantial respect to people and their bodies after death as well as before, the 
respect given depends on fortuitous factors. Thus this perspective is more negative 
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towards the physical and bodily aspects than I expected from an approach emphasizing 
our mutual dependencies and initial animal condition.  
 
 Kant provides us with a turn to the aesthetic, stressing the need for actual communication 
with others to realize morality. His theory consequently shares more common ground 
with the Ethics of Care and their relational perspective than expected at the outset of my 
inquiry. There appears to be very little cause to claim that the Kantian approach only 
respects persons on account of their rationality, and that it is necessarily insensitive 
towards the actual situations and relationships that people find themselves in. 
 
Care ethics is able to say more about particular affective relationships than the other 
theories and shares a strength of Virtue Ethics in not understanding responsibility as 
founded exclusively on voluntariness and choice. Interestingly, it is Kant’s position that 
has the advantage of understanding the self as a positive unity of ‘mind’ and ‘body’, of 
‘psyche’ and ‘soma’. As we have seen Kant moreover shares the relational strengths of 
the Ethics of Care in the emphasis of the realm ‘in-between’ judging subjects as fit for 
aesthetic and moral judgment, and of how we depend on this social and relational realm, 
both for the needs of our intellect and our sensibility. A sensus communis is thus the 
foundation of thinking and necessary to get morality (and politics) off the ground. This 
perspective should hence not be underestimated, even if credit is given to more 
‘intellectualist’ readings and general discomfort with deontology as providing ‘one 
thought too many’. 
 
In each perspective I have examined there is an underlying thread appearing in most of 
our theories regarding ‘the body’ since antiquity: It is seen as fundamentally different 
from the ‘I’ that we find in our words and thoughts. This ‘split’ is replayed in most if not 
all of ethics through our history, and is a fundamental challenge to a development of an 
ethics that has the whole unity of what we might call ‘the embodied self’ in its sight. 
Even if we postpone the discussion on whether such a perspective is what we really want 
from ethics until it has been further developed, challenging this fundamental division is a 
first step in developing such a position.  
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One of the crucial stories to be learned from the feminist or care ethics perspectives is 
that merely reversing an earlier split is tempting. Especially if one of the main points is to 
simultaneously present a critique of an earlier ‘splitting’ position. The challenge thus is 
that if we find that splitting the moral subject into material and immaterial (body and 
spirit) is unfortunate or questionable from a political or moral perspective: - overcoming 
this split means unerringly not to take it as fundamental. Casting a theoretical position as 
explicitly contrary to the previous split too easily ends up in a reversal. Instead the 
perspective needs to be developed anew from ‘the bottom up’.149 Such a project will 
demand going back to some very basic assumptions of our current ethical attitudes to 
reconsider otherwise unquestioned premises. Much might also be developed out of a 
reexamination of how ‘splitting’ has skewed our perspective on what is taken as natural 
in our current positions. The feminist critique of ‘universality’ vs. ‘situatedness’ is one 
such important point, our traditional insistence that what is ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ is 
best developed without affective correction or influence is another. Indeed, the ideas that 
our bodies are separate from what thinks - that feeling and thinking are different 
activities, one part of the flesh the other independent of the flesh, are themselves not 
beyond scrutiny. They are themselves historical constructions of what to hold as ‘true’ 
and ‘valuable’ with their own ‘political’ consequences.  
 
Reexamining these taken-for-granted starting points might also drive us into a 
confrontation with how the division of science into ‘natural’ and ‘social’ articulates a 
specific perspective on ‘what’ and ‘how’ we are. One perspective that often appears to be 
lost in both ‘natural’ and ‘social’ sciences today, is the perspective of how ‘the body’ is 
anything but static or constant throughout our lives. As we move from infancy to 
adulthood, through puberty and into old age, our relationships (and vulnerability and 
dependencies) towards our bodies and towards our surroundings are never constant. It is 
indeed not possible to point at any place in our lives where our ‘mind’ is in control of the 
totality of our physical aspects, and this ‘split’ of power must indeed itself be questioned, 
and not be naturalized. This fluctuation of change within the self subsequently often 
                                                 
149 And not ‘top to bottom’ as in Gilligan’s description of the faults of ‘male psychology’. 
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remains hidden on account of how our perspectives today are divided into stale ideas 
about ‘soma’ and ‘psyche’ (or something very similar).  
 
Keeping in mind the difficulty of avoiding a mere reversal, it is still possible to question 
to what extent the flesh that is you should be given weight in my consideration of you, or 
indeed in my encounters with you. In any real ‘intersubjective’ environment the image of 
your flesh (your looks, your tone of voice, your smell etc.) usually precedes my full 
comprehension of you, or anything at least approaching such an understanding.150 
Understanding vulnerability and dependency might demand that we comprehend that it is 
the unity of you which is vulnerable and dependent. Not something which is accidental to 
the ‘real’ you or merely the accidental or constructed site of the ‘real’ you. 
 
To some extent our fuller understanding of the basic unit of moral worth might lead us 
into a position where what is ‘really’ you might be indistinguishable from the 
relationships that you are part of: The (sometimes caring) relationships which from the 
Kantian perspective, are essential to the development of your taste and practical 
judgment. And divergence in the formation of these relationships, divergence in the 
formation of your flesh, and divergence in the formation of your communication with 
your inner ‘I’, are equally significant in order to comprehend who and what you are, and 
how you are to be treated with respect.  
 
From this ‘new’ perspective some questions that previously have been thought to be 
essential might fade in importance. Arguing where to precisely place the boundary 
between ‘body’ and ‘mind’, ‘soma’ and ‘psyche’, might no longer be seen as crucial, at 
least not in a moral perspective. Species-membership as a criterion on whom or what to 
care about or to label as capable of caring might be questioned and seen as less 
fundamental than it tends to be today. Political differences and political rights need not be 
labeled as necessarily dependent on possessing a certain spiritual or bodily capability. 
This formative setting of political boundaries could itself be brought to light as a 
                                                 
150 Any third person ontology will of course remain different from first person ontology. 
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fundamentally political question to be settled by political means. Responsibility is less of 
a question about free choice and volition than we have assumed in the ‘liberal’ political 
tradition. Giving ‘voice’ to those unable to speak does not necessarily impute an “equal 
but different” standard as the basis for being admitted into the political sphere. It might 
just as well imply ‘political’ entitlement without having to be essentially the same; more 
room for being ‘different while equal’. Casting the problem of ‘the ethical worth of the 
body’ as opposed to ‘the ethical worth of the rational spirit’ as a necessary dualism here 
is probably part of the problem, not the solution.  
 
Keeping in mind the background question of “elective ventilation”151, we naturally 
remain without a definitive and clear cut answer on what to do in these difficult 
situations. Yet, I hope to have pointed out some aspects of respecting people and their 
bodies that are important, and how this is important even in the absence of consciousness 
or life. Whether this should make us abandon our current practices concerning organ 
transplantation, and adopt different attitudes towards temporarily or permanently 
unconscious people, is outside the scope of this paper. We nonetheless cannot define 
away the problems of triage. 
 
My whish is to point out that ‘the mind’ or ‘consciousness’ or ‘psyche’ cannot be treated 
as if unaffected by our somatic being, and that this in turn is significant in asking how 
much weight ‘the body’ should have in moral matters. The position that ‘the body’ does 
not matter in practical considerations is in this context much more extreme than current 
debate seems to admit. Attempting to resolve ethical dilemmas about abortion, organ 
donation or euthanasia by looking for a proof of the mind’s separation or boundary from 
‘the body’ is to take too much for granted about the value of ‘the body’, or indeed the 
value of the ‘situatedness’ of the self as well. Bodily aspects, flesh and blood, 
relationships to friends and kin, and mental events like dreaming and thinking are as far 
as we know integrated in our being; and even though these aspects may be separated for 
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purposes of study, they must be reconnected if we are to have any concept of the unity 
that is to be treated with moral respect. Neither aspect should thus be cast as more natural 
or less culturally constructed than the other, nor should we forget that moral respect 
fundamentally depends on bodies being involved.
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